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GREGORY T. HUNTER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court ot Appeals in State v. Hunter, 
185 Ut. Adv. R. 13 (1992) is attached as Appendix A to this 
petition. The trial courts finding of fact and order are attached 
hereto as appendix B. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on April 21, 
1992 (Appendix A). This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
therefore filed timely with this court pursuant to Rule 48 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2 (5) (1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of the Proceedings Below. 
Priority No. 11 
Case No. 910319-CA 
Defendant Gregory T. Hunter was charged with theft, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 
76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1)(d), (1990) (R.l). The allegedly stolen 
items had been found in his dormitory room at Utah State University 
by university officials and police (T.35.38 and 39). Following the 
seizure of those items, defendant allegedly confessed the theft to 
university police (T. 40 and 43). 
Defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the seized 
items and his unrecorded alleged confession from the evidence 
against him (R. 145). The trial court granted the motion 
(R.22,23). The State of Utah then petitioned the Utah Court of 
Appeals to take an interlocutory appeal from the order of 
suppression (R.15). The Court of Appeals granted the petition on 
June 26, 1991. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of 
suppression entered by the trial court. 
The Court of Appeals held that the warrantless search 
undertaken by University officials and police was reasonable and 
therefore did not violate defendant's constitutional protections as 
embodied in the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The Court of 
Appeals held that the evidence seized in defendant's apartment 
could properly be admitted against him in his trial for theft. 
The Court of Appeals, based on its holding regarding the 
reasonableness of the search did not reach the issue of whether or 
not defendant's unrecorded alleged confession was properly 
suppressed by the trial court. Mr. Hunter seeks review of the 
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decision of the Court of Appeals regarding the constitutionality of 
the university search under the U.S. and Utah Constitutions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court found the following statement of facts 
(R. 24-26) which were substantially adopted by the Court of 
Appeals. 
1. Defendant is a student at Utah State University and was 
residing on campus at 227 Mountain View Towers on April 4, 
1991. 
2. The Defendant signed a resident hall contract which was re-
ceived in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Paragraph 
fifteen and sixteen of said contract read as follows (R. 131): 
15. ENTRY TO STUDENT ROOMS 
University officials reserve the right to enter and inspect 
residence hall rooms at any time. Inspections will occur when 
necessary to protect and maintain the property of the 
University, the health and safety of its students, or whenever 
necessary to aid in the basic responsibility of the University 
regarding discipline and maintenance of an education 
atmosphere. In such cases effort will be made to notify the 
resident(s) in advance and to have the resident(s) present at 
the time of entry. 
16. ROOM CHECKS 
University officials reserve the right to enter student rooms 
or apartments for the purpose of room checks and repairs. 
Room checks will take place each quarter in each residence 
hall. Room checks are conducted to check for the following: 
(1) fire or safety hazards, (2) cleanliness of apartment or 
room, (3) maintenance problems, (4) occupancy, and (5) 
inventory of equipment and furnishings. If housekeeping 
standards are not met within a specified period of time a 
cleaning charge of $15 per hour will be assessed to the 
resident(s) . Failure to adequately clean room and/or apartment 
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will also result in disciplinary action. 
Defendant by signing said agreement acknowledges he had read 
and agreed to comply with the terms and conditions of 
occupancy issued by housing office. 
3. The State presented evidence that because of reoccurring 
vandalism, damage, and other problems occurring on the second 
floor of Mountain View Towers in mid-March 1991, University 
officials met with residents of said floor and told them that 
if problems did not cease, room to room inspections would be 
conducted as expressly authorized by the terms and conditions 
of occupancy agreement. Defendant was personally present at 
this meeting. 
4. On the morning of April 4, 1991, Director of Housing, Gary 
Smith, discovered that additional problems had occurred the 
night before on the second floor of the Mountain View tower 
dormitory. After he had investigated and confirmed the latest 
damage, Director Smith decided to conduct the room-to-room 
inspection of which the residents had been notified some two 
weeks before. He requested that'the University Police and the 
football coach accompany the housing officials on the 
inspection. 
5. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on April 4, 1991, the University 
officials began a room-to-room inspection on the second floor 
of the Mountain View Tower dormitory. At each room, the 
University officials identified themselves. If an occupant 
was present, he let them in to inspect; if no one was present, 
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a pass key was used to gain entrance for the inspection. 
6. When the University officials arrived at room 207, no one was 
present, so the housing officials entered with a pass key. 
Upon entry, Director Smith could see stolen property (a 
University sign and a banner), in plain view. At Director 
Smith's request, the University Police took those items into 
custody. (The trial court transcript indicated that it was 
the police who observed and seized the evidence [T. 31, 32, 
35].) The inspection process then continued, until all thirty 
(30) rooms on the second floor had been inspected. 
7. Approximately an hour later, the defendant came into the 
office of the University Police, complaining about the items 
which had been seized by the housing officials. The police 
then advised the Defendant of his Miranda rights, even though 
he was neither under arrest nor in custody. The Defendant 
expressly v/aived those rights, and then voluntarily confessed 
to the theft of stolen the University sign and banner found in 
his room. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I . A WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO AND SEARCH OF 
GREGORY HUNTER'S DORMITORY ROOM IS IN CONFLICT WITH 
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN STATE V. LAR0CC0. 
The Court of Appeals found that the search of Hunter's 
dormitory room was reasonable and therefore constitutional. This 
finding relied on an interpretation which significantly diminished 
the constitutionally mandated search requirements set forth in 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990). 
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This court noted in Larocco that law in the area of 
search and seizure was confused and inconsistent. Based on that 
observation, this court determined to articulate a ciear standard 
by which the reasonableness of a search could be judged. The 
standard was grounded in the concept of a defendant's expectation 
of privacy. If the expectation of privacy threshold is met, 
Article lf Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, applies. If 
Article 1, Section 14 applies, "warrant less searches will be 
permitted only where they satisfy their traditional justification, 
namely, to protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent 
the destruction of evidence." Id. at 469-470; see also 
Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 272 A.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1970) ("[t]he 
test to be used in determining the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment protections is whether or not the particular locale is 
one 'in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from 
governmental intrusion'") ci ting Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 
88 S. Ct. 2120, 20 L. Ed.2d 1154 (1968). 
The Court of Appeals was correct in its observation that 
this case is one of first impression in the State of Utah. 
However, authority from other jurisdictions holds that in the 
context of university searches of dormitory rooms, the expectation 
of privacy threshold is the starting point from which to judge the 
reasonableness of university action. Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 
supra; Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F.Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975); 
Piazzoia v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Morale v. 
Grigel , 422 F.Supp. 988 (D. New Hamp. 1976); Delgado, Col lege 
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Searches and Seizures; Students, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 
26 Hastings L.J. 57 (1974); 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.11 
(c), at 47-468 (2d ed. 1987). 
a. HUNTER ENJOYED A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY IN HIS DORMITORY ROOM. 
The Court of Appeals does not specifically find nor 
address the existence or extent of Mr. Hunter's privacy 
expectation. The court instead finds that based on the 
university's duty to provide a clean, safe, weil disciplined 
environment in its dormitories the university was free to rake 
"whatever reasonable measures are necessary." State v. Hunter, 185 
Ut. Adv. R. 13 at 15 (1992). However, establisnmg the threshold 
requirement of an expectation of privacy is essential to an 
analysis of whether the university action was in fact reasonable. 
Commonwealth v. HcClosKey, supra; Piazzola v. Watkins, supra. As 
noted by previous courts addressing the issue; "reasonableness" 
involves testing "the need to search against the invasion which the 
search entails." Morale v. Grigel, 422 F.Supp. 988 (D. New Hamp. 
1976) . 
"A dormitory room is a student's home away from home, and 
any student may reasonably expect that once the door is closed to 
the outside, his or her solitude and secrecy will not be destroyed 
by a governmental intrusion without at least permission, if not 
invitation. The Fourth Amendment right by its very terms 
guarantees this." Id. at 997; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967); Piazzola v. Watkins, supra; Smyth v. Lubbers, supra; 
People v. Cohen, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1968). 
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For ail practical purposes Hunter's dorm room v/as his 
home and he had "the same interest in the privacy of his room as 
any adult has in the privacy of his home, dwelling or lodging." 
Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F.Supp. at 786. Once this privacy interest 
is established, Larocco requires a warrant or a show of exigent 
circumstances and probable cause. see also Commonwealth v. 
McCloskey, supra. The only way the University may avoid this 
mandate is by exempting its action from traditional constitutional 
scrutiny. 
b. THE UNIVERSITY'S SEARCH WAS NOT THE TYPE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH UHICH HAY BE CONDUCTED 
ABSENT PROBABLE CAUSE AND A WARRANT. 
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the view that 
USU's search v/as conducted pursuant to the University housing 
contract and was permissible based on the University's 
responsibility for maintaining order and discipline. In support 
of this analysis, the Court quotes extensively from Moore v. 
Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F.Supp. 725 (M.D. 
Ala. 1968). The Moore court held that a warrantless search of 
student dormitory rooms in search of drugs was not a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. The Moore court found this to be so based 
on the "special relationship" between college students who reside 
in dormitories and the college. 
The Moore case held that if "the action of the college 
authorities—is necessary in aid of the basic responsibility of 
the institution regarding discipline and maintenance of an 
'educational atmosphere,' then it will be presumed facially 
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reasonable despite the fact that it may infringe to some extent 
on the outer bounds of the Fourth Amendment rights of students." 
Id. at 729; Utah v. Hunter, 185 Ut. Adv. R. atl4. 
The analysis of the Moore decision has been questioned. 
4 w. LaFave, Search and Seizure, §10.11 (c), at 65-67 (2d. ed. 
1987); Smyth v. Lubbers, supra; People v. Cohen, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 
706 (1968); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, supra. 
In Smyth the college attempted to justify its search of 
defendant's room arguing that the search regulation was essential 
to the maintenance of order and discipline on campus and that the 
search conducted pursuant to university regulations was 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. "The 
theory is that the special characteristics of the college defeat 
or seriously qualify whatever expectation of privacy the student 
might have in other contexts or vis-a-vis other social 
institutions." Id. at 789. 
The Smyth court flatly rejected "the theory that 
college officials acting pursuant to regulations may infringe on 
the outer limits of an adult's constitutional rights . . . [t]he 
Fourth Amendment is flexible enough to meet a variety of public 
needs, but it will not admit a slight infringement." Id. at 789. 
According to the Smyth court based on the defendant's clear 
privacy interest in his room, the facts were not at the "outer 
limits" but at the core of the Fourth Amendment. Such a core 
right may not be infringed based on "conclusory statements about 
the college's need for order and discipline". . . Id. A means 
9 
employed by the university "must be consistent with 
constitutional limitations." Id. 
State v. Kappesf 6 Ariz. App. 567, 550 P. 2d 121, 
(1976), relied on by the Court of Appeals is inapposite. The 
initial search in Kappes was conducted by school officials 
pursuant to an express provision of the housing regulations which 
provided that the University "could enter a dormitory room to 
inspect for cleanliness, safety, or the need for repairs." Id. 
at 122. Notice of the room inspection was posted twenty-four 
(24) hours beforehand. Id. There is no contention that the search 
in Kappes was for any purpose other than that expressly 
articulated in the regulation. It was only after the University 
housing officials saw marijuana butts and a pipe in plain view on 
defendant's desk that they contacted law enforcement officials 
who conducted a second search. Id. at 123. 
The court in Kappes specifically notes this distinction 
stating: 
other courts have held that if a lav; enforcement official 
initiated the investigation and, then gained entry to a 
student's room without a warrant, everything seized thereby 
would be barred under the Forth Amendment. . . [t]he same 
result has followed where the entry is made by a school 
official who does so at the request of, or in cooperation 
with, law enforcement officials . . . [b]ut where the entry 
is made by a student advisor conducting a routine dormitory 
inspection announced in advance, we cannot say that the 
intrusion is the result of government action which will 
invoke the Fourth Amendment, and, consequently, the 
exclusionary rule. citations omitted, Id. at 123-24. 
The search of Iir. Hunter's dormitory room was not 
routine nor administrative. Facts found by the trial court 
established that USU officials and a campus police officer 
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undertook the dormitory search based on "vandalism, damage and 
other problems" which apparently had occurred occasionally and on 
the night before the search in question. The facts demonstrate 
that the search was conducted specifically to discover evidence 
linking residents of the second floor of the dormitory to 
activities which Utah lav/ makes illegal. Furthermore, university 
regulations specifically prohibit the possession of alcohol and 
firearms and the record and opinion at the Court of Appeals note 
that alcohol and firearms or explosives were also sought related 
to the damage and vandalism. 
Under these circumstances Xappes is plainly 
distinguishable. Furthermore, as noted by one commentator, if a 
university search purportedly made for the purpose of responding 
to an emergency situation uncovers "evidence leading to either a 
criminal prosecution or disciplinary action. . . then certainly 
'official motives must undergo scrutiny.'" 4 W. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure §10.11 (c), at 469 (2d. ed. 1987); Armstrong, Col lege 
Search and Seizures: Privacy and Due Process Problems on Campus, 
5 Crim. L. Bui . 537 ( 1969) . 
C. THE PARTICIPATION OF A UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
POLICE OFFICER MANDATES STRICT COMPLIANCE 
WITH FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 
14 PROTECTIONS. 
The Court of Appeals granted broad iatitude to the 
university and treated as minor the involvement of USU Police 
Officer Steven Milne. However, Officer Milne's participation 
required, if anything, a stricter conformance with the warrant 
protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of 
11 
the Utah Constitution. 
The alleged 3ustification for desiring the 
participation of Officer mine in the search in addition to 
involvement of USU Director of Housing, Gary Smith, the head 
custodian and a USU football coach was "solely for the purpose of 
providing assistance in the event that Smith discovered any 
problems that he was not able to handle on his own." Utah v. 
Hunter, 185 Ut. Adv. R. at 13. What problems Smith contemplated 
that three adult men with official university credentials could 
not handle is unclear and irrelevant. The participation of 
Officer Ililne mandated, without question, adherence to 
constitutional standards. "When a law enforcement officer 
directs, participates or acquiesces m a search conducted by 
private parties, that search must comport with usual 
constitutional standards. (emphasis added) II.J. v. State of 
Florida, 399 So.2d 996 (Ct. App. Fla. 1981). The 11.J. court 
additionally notes that "where a law enforcement officer directs, 
participates, or acquiesces in a search conducted by school 
officials, the officer must have probable cause for that search, 
even though the school officials acting alone are treated as 
state officials subject to a lesser constitutional standard for 
conducting these searches in light of the in loco parentis 
doctrine. The M.J, case concerned a high school student and thus 
the in loco parentis doctrine may have been applicable. In this 
case, of course, no such doctrine is available to or asserted by 
the State. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ. 
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284 F.Supp. at 729. The involvement of campus police officers :n 
Smyth persuaded that court to reiterate the application of the 
Fourth Amendment to the search. Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 
at 787. 
d. THE UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY HOUSING CONTRACT SIGNED 
BY HUNTER DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS NOR OPERATE AS CONSENT 
TO THE SEARCH BY UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS. 
The Court cf Appeals held that "by signing the 
aforementioned housing contract. Hunter agreed to the 
university's right of reasonaole inspection and waived any Fourth 
Amendment objections to the university's exercise of thar right." 
Id. at 15. The Court of Appeals' holding again rests on a view 
that the university searcn was reasonable under ~he 
circumstances. However, this analysis offers such wide latitude 
to the university that virtually any search asserted as necessary 
by university officials would be de facto reasonable. 
Surely Hunter did not contemplate a warrantless search 
of his dormitory room without reasonable notice and subsequent 
criminal prosecution. Even in Moore, the court founc tnat the 
right of school authorities to search must be basec on a 
reasonable belief on the part of college autnorities "that a 
student is using a dormitory room for a purpose which is illegal 
or which would otherwise seriously interfere with campus 
discipline." Hoore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ.f 
284 F. Supp. at 730. 
The State alleged on appeal and the Court of Appeals 
apparently agreed that a generalized threat to searcn made some 
13 
tv/o weeks prior to the actual search of the dormitory rooms 
constituted sufficient notice. However, a generalized notice 
couched in terms of an ambiguous threat to search made some tv/o 
weeks prior to the actual search cannot be said under thoughtful 
analysis to truly be notice. 
There is no evidence that Hunter particularly was 
suspected of any illegal activity and no evidence was found of 
his participation in the vandalism, alcohol use or explosives 
possession. It is important to point out that the defendant in 
Moore was not facing criminal prosecution but only college 
disciplinary proceedings. This was important in that court's 
analysis for it noted "that cue process in college disciplinary 
proceedings does not require full blown adversary hearings 
subject to Rules of Evidence and all constitutional criminal 
guarantees." Id. at 730; see also Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 272 
A.2d at 274 (finding that Moore did not apply because it did not 
involve criminal prosecution). Thus, even presuming Moore is 
credible law, its teaching is that because college disciplinary 
proceedings are not criminal proceedings the standard required of 
college authorities to justify a search is lower than the 
constitutional protection in criminal cases of "probable cause." 
Id. Of course, Mr. Hunter is the subject of a criminal 
prosecution for theft. 
Greg Hunter sought housing on the campus of usu for any 
one of a number of reasons. His decision to seek housing on 
campus and to enter into the boiler plate housing contract 
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drafted by the university should not now be argued to demonstrate 
that Mr. Hunter either waived constitutional protection or 
consented to warrantless searches of his room for the purpose of 
discovering conduct or evidence which would indicate a violation 
of university policy or State law. "[A] blanket authorization in 
an adhesion contract that the [university] may search the room 
for violation of whatever substantive regulations the 
[university] chooses to adopt and pursuant to whatever search 
regulation the [university] chooses to adopt is not the type of 
focused, deliberate, and immediate consent contemplated by the 
Constitution." Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. at 788. 
The fact that Hunter signed a contract generally giving the 
university the right to inspect his dormitory room did not confer 
an absolute right to the university. "A student who has a 
college as a landlord is not in a significantly different 
position from a student who lives off campus in a boarding 
house." 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.6(c), at 778 (2d. ed. 
1987) "The latter is quite obviously protected by the Supreme 
Court ruling in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 81 S.Ct. 
776, 5 L.Ed 2d 828 (1961) that a landlord may not consent to a 
police search of his tenant's quarters merely because he has some 
right of entry of his own in connection with his position as 
landlord." LaFave at 778. Of course this does not mean that 
university officials are not entitled to enter a dormitory room 
absent probable cause. 
"It must be remembered that there does exist a 
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landlord-tenant relationship between the university and the 
student. While, consistent with the decided Fourth Amendment 
cases, this does not mean that the university-as-landlord can 
enter to find evidence of crime or can give consent to a police 
search which will be effective against the tenant, it has been 
recognized that a landlord may enter for certain purposes, such 
as to view waste or to make repairs. There is no reason why this 
should not be equally true of the university-landlord." 
citations omitted W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.II, at 468. 
POINT II. A WARRANT WAS REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE 
SEARCH OF HUNTER'S DORMITORY ROOM BY UTAH STATE 
UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS. 
If university officials suspected certain dormitory 
residents of improper activities the evidence of their probable 
cause should have been taken to a court and a warrant sought. 
"Securing a warrant to search a student's room, whether from a 
civil magistrate or from the College Judiciary, means some 
inconvenience to the college officials. However, this is not an 
inconvenience to be weighed against the claims of administrative 
efficiency . . . and is an inconvenience justified in a free 
society to protect the constitutional value of privacy which 
adults who happen to be students share equally with other 
citizens." citations omitted, Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. at 
793. The Smyth court goes on to note that the securing of a 
search warrant in advance may hold important collateral benefits 
to the university. In this case, the ambiguity surrounding the 
necessity of the search, the reasons for the search, and the 
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specific objectives intended to be met by the search may well 
have been answered :f the university had been required, in 
advance, to lustify to the court through a probabie cause 
affidavit the need for the search. "A prior affidavit and a 
v/arrant ouild a record, establish the presumptive validity of the 
search, and minimize the burden of justification in post search 
hearings." Id. 
In this case there is no allegation that the police or 
university officials were in danger, that Hunter would flee, or 
that the evidence found in his room would be destroyed. In the 
absence of these exigent circumstances the securing of a warrant 
is required. State v. Larocco, supra. As previously noted by 
this court, it would have required no great effort to secure such 
a warrant and protect the rights of Mr. Hunter. State v. Larocco 
("in light of ease with which warrants can be obtained under 
Utah's telephonic v/arrant statute" there is "no persuasive reason 
why the officer cannot take time to secure a warrant) 794 P.2d at 
470. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence found by university officials and the 
university police officer was properly suppressed by the trial 
court. This Court has held that the "exclusion of legally 
obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations 
of Article I, Section 14. State v Larocco, at 472. Such a result 
is also required by the Fourth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed.2d 1081 (1961). The decision of the 
17 
Court of Appeals is in direct conflict with existing law and the 
weight of authority on this significant constitutional issue. 
Based on the important issues involved in this case and the split 
of authority in various jurisdictions, this Court's guidance on 
this issue is critical. Based on the foregoing, Mr. Hunter 
respectfully requests that this petition for writ of certiorari 
be granted and that this court review each of the issues 
addressed. 
Dated this ^' of May, 1992. 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
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I certify that I hand delivered ten (10) copies of the foregoing 
to the Utah Supreme Court, Salt Lake City, Utah, and four (4) 
copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol 
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RUSSON, Judge: 
The State of Utah filed this interlocutory appeal from an 
order granting defendant Gregory T. Hunter's motion to suppress 
evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search of his 
dormitory room by a Utah State University official. We reverse 
and remand. 
FACTS 
On April 4, 1991, Gregory T. Hunter was charged with theft, 
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann, §§ 76-6-404 
and -412(1)(d) (1990),l following the seizure of stolen 
university property from his dormitory room and his subsequent 
confession to theft of those items. 
1. Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-404 (1990) enumerates the elements of 
theft; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(d) (1990) provides that if 
the value of the property stolen is $100 or less, then theft of 
such constitutes a class B misdemeanor. 
During the Spring of 1991, Hunter was a student at Utah 
State University in Logan, Utah and resided in Room 2 07 of 
Mountain View Towers, a campus dormitory. All of the students 
who lived in university-provided housing were required to sign a 
residence hall contract, which included the following provisions: 
13. HOUSING REGULATIONS. Students are 
required to abide by University and 
University Housing regulations as outlined in 
University publications, as well as such 
rules of conduct as have been adopted by the 
student organization of the hall in which 
they reside. . . . Housing regulations 
include, but are not limited to, the 
following: 
a) Utah state law prohibits the possession 
and/or consumption of all alcoholic beverages 
or the possession of alcoholic beverage 
containers in the residence halls. 
e) Firearms and explosives are absolutely 
prohibited in all residents' rooms/apartments 
at all times. . . . 
15. ENTRY TO STUDENT ROOMS. University 
officials reserve the right to enter and 
inspect residence hall rooms at any time. 
Inspections will occur when necessary to 
protect and maintain the property of the 
University, the health and safety of its 
students, or whenever necessary to aid in the 
basic responsibility of the University 
regarding discipline and maintenance of an 
educational atmosphere. In such cases effort 
will be made to notify the resident(s) in 
advance and to have the resident(s) present 
at the time of entry. 
In signing his contract, Hunter acknowledged that he had read and 
agreed to comply with all of the terms and conditions outlined in 
the residence hall contract. 
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In early 1991, numerous incidents of vandalism, damage, and 
other problems occurred on the second floor of Mountain View 
Towers, which incidents university officials suspected were the 
result of violations of the alcohol and explosives prohibitions. 
In mid-March, university officials met with the residents of that 
floor. Hunter was present during that meeting, at which the 
residents were told that if the problems did not cease, room-to-
room inspections would be conducted pursuant to the residence 
hall contracts. 
On the morning of April 4, 1991, Gary Smith, Director of 
Housing and Food Services at Utah State University, received a 
report that further problems and damage had occurred on the 
second floor of Mountain View Towers. As a result of this 
report, Smith decided to conduct a room-to-room inspection. 
Without obtaining a search warrant, Smith began the inspection, 
accompanied by the head custodian, a football coach, and Officer 
Steven Milne, a university police officer. The presence of the 
football coach was requested because a number of football team 
members lived on the second floor of Mountain View Towers. 
Officer Milne was called solely for the purpose of providing 
assistance in the event that Smith discovered any problems that 
he was not able to handle on his own. 
The four men went from room to room, using the following 
procedure: At each room, Smith knocked on the door, identified 
himself to the occupant or occupants, and then conducted an 
inspection of the room. If no occupant was present, Smith 
admitted himself by using the head custodian's passkey, conducted 
an inspection, and then exited the room. In the course of the 
investigation, every room on the floor was inspected. 
No one was present in Hunter's room, so Smith used the 
passkey to gain entry. Upon entering the room, Smith saw stolen 
university property, consisting of a sign and a banner, in plain 
view in Hunter's room. At Smith's request, Officer Milne seized 
these items. 
Approximately one hour later, Hunter went to the university 
police office to complain about the inspection and seizure of the 
items from his room. At this point, although Hunter was neither 
under arrest nor in custody, the university police advised Hunter 
of his Miranda rights. Hunter expressly waived his Miranda 
rights and confessed to the theft of the sign and the banner that 
had been found in his room. 
Subsequently, Hunter was charged with theft, a class B 
misdemeanor. He filed a motion to suppress evidence of the sign 
and banner found in his room, as well as his confession. The 
trial court granted the motion, and the State filed this 
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interlocutory appeal, raising the following issue: Did the trial 
court err in determining that the warrantless entry of Hunter's 
room, and seizure of property found therein, violated his 
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures?2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's findings of fact underlying its decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress must be upheld unless they are 
clearly erroneous. However, we review the trial court's legal 
conclusions in regards thereto under a correction of error 
standard. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991), 
ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures . . . ." U.S. Const, amend. IV (emphasis added). Thus, 
the question before us is whether, in light of all of the facts 
and circumstances, Smith's search of Hunter's room was 
reasonable. 
Since this is an issue of first impression in Utah, we look 
to other jurisdictions for guidance. Our review of the cases 
from jurisdictions that have considered this issue reveals a 
split in authority among the various jurisdictions.3 Thus, we 
adopt the more persuasive approach, which holds that in cases 
such as the one at bar, n[t]he right of privacy protected by the 
2. The State further argues that even if the warrantless search 
did violate Hunter's constitutional rights, the trial court 
nonetheless erred in suppressing Hunter's confession on the basis 
that, but for the entry and seizure of the property, Hunter would 
not have confessed to the theft. Because of our resolution of 
the search issue, we need not address the State's argument on 
this second issue. 
3. Compare, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State 
Univ. , 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala. 1968); State v. Kappes, 26 
Ariz. App. 567, 550 P.2d 121, 124 (1976); People v. Kelly, 195 
Cal.App.2d 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1961); People v. Haskins, 48 
A.D.2d 480, 369 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1975) with Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 
F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. 
Mich. 1975); Morale v. Gricrel, 422 F. Supp. 988, (D. N.H. 1976); 
People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1968). 
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fourth amendment does not include freedom from reasonable 
inspection of a school-operated dormitory room by school 
officials." State v. Kappes, 26 Ariz. App. 567, 550 P.2d 121, 
124 (1976) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 
507 (1967)). 
The court in Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State 
Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968), outlined the reasoning 
for adopting such an approach: 
College students who reside in 
dormitories have a special relationship with 
the college involved. Insofar as the Fourth 
Amendment affects that relationship, it does 
not depend on either a general theory of the 
right of privacy or on traditional property 
concepts. The college does not stand, 
strictly speaking, iri loco parentis to its 
students, nor is their relationship purely 
contractual in the traditional sense. The 
relationship grows out of the peculiar and 
sometimes the seemingly competing interests 
of college and student. A student naturally 
has the right to be free of unreasonable 
search and seizures, and a tax-supported 
public college may not compel a "waiver11 of 
that right as a precedent to admission. The 
college, on the other hand, has an 
"affirmative obligation" to promulgate and 
enforce reasonable regulations designed to 
protect campus order and discipline and to 
promote an environment consistent with the 
educational process. The validity of the 
regulation authorizing search of dormitories 
thus does not depend on whether a student 
"waives" his right to Fourth Amendment 
protection or on whether he has "contracted" 
it away; rather, its validity is determined 
by whether the regulation is a reasonable ' 
exercise of the college's supervisory duty 
In other words, if the regulation—or, in the 
absence of a regulation, the action of the 
college authorities—is necessary in aid of 
the basic responsibility of the institution 
regarding discipline and maintenance of an 
"educational atmosphere," then it will be 
presumed facially reasonable despite the fact 
that it may infringe to some extent on the 
outer bounds of the Fourth Amendment rights 
of students. 
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Id, at 729 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the Moore court concluded 
that the search was reasonable, likening it to a number of 
Supreme Court cases in which searches had been found to be 
permissible because they were "conducted by a superior charged 
with a responsibility of maintaining discipline and order or of 
maintaining security.11 Id. at 730-31 (citing United States v. 
Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v. Collins, 
349 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Donate 269 F. 
Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967); 
United States v. Miller, 261 F. Supp. 442, 449 (D. Del. 1966)). 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized that "where 
state-operated educational institutions are involved, . . . 
[there is a] xneed for affirming the comprehensive authority of 
the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in 
the schools.'" Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180, 92 S. Ct. 
2338, 2345-46 (1972) (quoting Tinker v. Pes Moines Indep. 
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 89 S. Ct. 733, 737 
(1969)). Furthermore, even cases in those jurisdictions that 
have held that such searches are illegal acknowledge that 
universities have an interest in regulating student conduct. 
See, e.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(universities retain broad supervisory powers to permit them to 
adopt such regulations, so long as the regulation is reasonably 
construed and limited in its application); Morale v. Grigel, 422 
F. Supp. 988, 997 (D. N.H. 1976) (schools have a legitimate 
interest in preventing disruption on campus, as long as its 
interests are limited by its function as an educational 
institution). 
Applying this law to the facts of our case, we conclude that 
Smith's search was a reasonable exercise of the university's 
authority to maintain an educational environment. Students 
attending a university require and are entitled to an atmosphere 
that is conducive to educational pursuits. In a dormitory 
situation, it is the university that accepts the responsibility 
of providing this atmosphere. Thus, it is incumbent upon the 
university to take whatever reasonable measures are necessary to 
provide a clean, safe, well-disciplined environment in its 
dormitories. Due to numerous incidents of vandalism, damage, and 
other problems occurring on the second floor of Mountain View 
Towers, which incidents were suspected to be the result of 
violations of the alcohol and explosives prohibitions, university 
officials had an interest in correcting the same in order to 
maintain a proper educational environment. See Kappes, 550 P.2d 
at 124. 
Moreover, the housing contract between Hunter and Utah State 
University offers further support for the determination that the 
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search was reasonable. As part of Hunter's agreement to live in 
university-provided housing, he was required to sign a residence 
hall contract, the provisions of which included a prohibition 
against the possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages or 
the possession of alcoholic beverage containers in residence 
halls and a prohibition against the possession of explosives in 
all residents' rooms at all times. In order to enforce these 
regulations, university officials reserved the right to enter and 
inspect residence hall rooms at any time "to protect and maintain 
the property of the University, the health and safety of its 
students, or whenever necessary to aid in the basic 
responsibility of the University regarding discipline and 
maintenance of an educational atmosphere." By signing t^e 
.•AfiaESSfe^^ Hnr^.P.r aay^ed to frhe 
university's right of reasonable inspection and waived any Fourth 
!SS^^ the una^^r^t^ that rightr 
Thus, given the fact that Hunter acknowledged the university's 
right to inspect his room when he signed his housing contract, 
and accepted the room on that condition, it can hardly be said 
that the stolen university property seized in plain view had been 
the subject of an unreasonable search. See Moore, 284 F. Supp. 
at 729-31; Kappes, 550 P.2d at 124. 
In fact, not only did university officials have a right to 
maintain an educational atmosphere, they had a contractual duty 
to do so. Paragraph 21 of the housing agreement provides the 
basis of such duty: 
21. AGREEMENT TO STUDENTS. For those 
students who remain current on their 
financial accounts and who abide by the above 
stated Terms and Conditions of Occupancy, 
Utah State University Housing agrees to 
provide an environment which is clean, safe, 
well maintained, and to promote an atmosphere 
which is conducive to study and free of undue 
disturbances. 
Further support for the reasonableness of the search is 
found in the fact that effort was made to notify the residents in 
advance of the possibility of university officials pursuing such 
a remedy* In mid-March, university officials met with the 
residents of Hunter's floor, at which time the residents were 
told that if the problems did not cease, room-to-room inspections 
would be conducted pursuant to the residence hall contract. 
Hunter was present during that meeting. It is clear that, under 
the facts of this case, such notice was sufficient to alert 
residents of the imminent possibility that such a search would be 
undertaken. Additionally, since the search was conducted in 
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mid-morning and Smith knocked on each door before entering, we 
cannot say that the search was overly intrusive under the 
circumstances of this case. Also, the fact that further problems 
and damage were reported on the very morning of the room-to-room 
search supports the conclusion that Smith's decision to search 
was reasonable. 
Lastly, it is important to distinguish what did not occur: 
This is not a case in which university officials took action at 
the behest of or as part of a joint investigation with the 
police. Compare Piazzola, 442 F.2d at 286; Moore, 284 F. Supp. 
at 727-28; People v. Kelly, 195 Cal.App.2d 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177 
(1961); People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 
(1968); Commonwealth v. McCloskeyf 217 Pa.Super. 432, 272 A.2d 
271 (1970). Nor did university officials attempt to delegate 
their right to inspect rooms to the police, which would result in 
the circumvention of traditional restrictions on police activity. 
Compare Piazzola, 442 F.2d at 286; Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 728; 
Kelly, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 179; McCloskey, 272 A.2d at 272. In 
light of the recurring troubles with vandalism and other damage 
that had occurred on Hunter's floor, Smith alone made the 
decision to conduct a room-to-room search for university 
purposes, without any input from the university police. The sole 
purpose of Officer Milne's presence was to provide assistance in 
the event that Smith confronted problems he was not able to 
handle on his own. Thus, no action was taken which would promote 
circumvention of constitutional restrictions placed on police 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
The search undertaken to protect the university's interest 
in maintaining a safe and proper educational environment, as well 
to fulfill the requirements of the housing contract, was 
reasonable. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's 
determination that evidence of the stolen property found in 
Hunter's room should be suppressed. Additionally, since the 
trial court's sole ground in suppressing Hunter's confession is 
based on its erroneous determination that the stolen property 
should be suppressed, that determination is also reversed. This 
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matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
WE C 
Regnal W. Garff, Judgef >•' 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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APPENDIX B 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff ] 
vs. ] 
GREGORY T. HUNTER, ] 
Defendant ] 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
> CRIMINAL NO. 911000438 
THE DEFENDANT having filed a Motion to suppress Evidence 
upon the grounds of illegal seizure came on for hearing on May 
7, 1991. Evidence was presented and arguments presented and 
the parties having submitted written Memorandas. Based thereon 
the Court issues the following Memorandum Decision: 
FACTS 
1. Defendant is a student at Utah State University and was 
residing on campus at 227 Mountain View Towers on April 4, 
199. 
2. The Defendant signed a resident hall contract which was 
received in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit #1. Paragraph 
fifteen and sixteen of said contract read as follows: 
15. ENTRY TO STUDENT ROOMS 
University officials reserve the right to enter and 
inspect residence hall rooms at any time. Inspections 
will occur when necessary to protect and maintain the 
property of the University, the health and safety of 
its students, or whenever necessary to aid in the 
basic responsibility of the University regarding 
discipline and maintenance of an educational 
atmosphere. In such cases effort will be made to 
notify the resident(s) in advance and to have the 
resident(s) present at the time of entry. 
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16. ROOM CHECKS 
University officials reserve the right to enter 
student rooms or apartments for the purpose of room 
checks and repairs. Room checks will take place each 
quarter in each residence hall. Room checks are 
conducted to check for the following: (1) fire or 
safety hazards, (2) cleanliness of apartment or room, 
(3) maintenance problems, (4) occupancy, and (5) 
inventory of equipment and furnishings. If 
housekeeping standards are not met within a specified 
period of time a cleaning charge of $15 per hour will 
be assessed to the resident(s). Failure to adequately 
clean room and/or apartment will also result in 
disciplinary action. 
Defendant by signing said agreement acknowledges he had 
read and agreed to comply with the terms and conditions of 
occupancy issued by housing office. 
3. State presented evidence that because of reoccurring 
vandalism, damage, and other problems occurring on the 
second floor of Mount View Towers in mid March 1991, 
University officials met with residents of said floor and 
told them that if problems did not cease, room to room 
inspections would be conducted as expressly authorized by 
the terms and conditions of occupancy agreement. Defendant 
was personally present at this meeting. 
4. On the morning of April 4, 1991, Director of Housing, Gary 
Smith, discovered that additional problems had occurred the 
night before on the second floor of the Mountain View Tower 
dormitory. After he had investigated and confirmed the 
latest damage, Director Smith decided to conduct the 
room-to-room inspection of which the residents had been 
notified some two weeks before. He requested that the 
University Police and the football coach accompany the 
housing officials on the inspection. 
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5. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on April 4, 1991, the 
University officials began a room-to-room inspection on the 
second floor of the Mountain View Tower dormitory. At each 
room, the University officials identified themselves. If 
an occupant was present, he let them in to inspect; if no 
one was present, a pass key was used to gain entrance for 
the inspection. 
6. When the University officials arrived at room 207, no one 
was present, so the housing officials entered with a pass 
key. Upon entry, Director Smith could see stolen property 
(a University sign and a banner), in plain view. At 
Director Smith's request, the University Police took those 
items into custody. The inspection process then continued, 
until all thirty (30) rooms on the second floor had been 
inspected. 
7. Approximately an hour later, the defendant came into the 
office of the University Police, complaining about the 
items which had been seized by the housing officials. The 
police then advised the Defendant of his Miranda rights, 
even though he was neither under arrest nor in custody. 
The Defendant expressing those rights, and then voluntarily 
confessed to having stolen the University sign and banner 
found in his room. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
The Defendant argues that the foregoing search violated 
Defendant's constitutional rights under Amendment II of the 
United State Constitution and Section 1, Article 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 




The State cites the case of New Jersey vs. T, L, P., 469 US 
325, 83 L ED 2d 720, 103 S Ct 733 (1985), for the proposition 
that searches conducted by school officials such as this are 
not required to obtain a search warrant to search a student's 
room who is under their authority; since a student has a 
reduced expectation of privacy on school campuses, and school 
officials must swiftly deal with disciplinary problems in 
school. 
This case involved the search of a student's person where 
marijuana was seized by a school official. The United States 
Supreme Court in foot note 7 states: 
We here consider only searches carried out 
by school authorities acting alone and on 
their own authority. This case does not 
present the question of the appropriate 
standard for assessing the legality of 
searches conducted by school officials in 
conjunction with or at the behest of law 
enforcement agencies, and we express no 
opinion on that question. 
The State further argues that the Utah Supreme Court has 
not decided a school search issue under the Utah constitution 
and therefore New Jersey vs. T. L. O. supercedes the cases 
cited by Defendant including State vs. Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460 
(Utah 1990), which the State contends falls in the automobile 
exception to a search warrant requirement under the Utah 
Constitution. 
The Court finds that the search in this case met the 
reasonable test outlined in New Jersey vs. T. C. 0. were this 
case to be decided under Federal law. However, this case 
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falls under the Footnote 7 exception as noted above. 
The Defendant also asserts his rights under the Utah 
Constitution above mentioned were also violated by this search 
by the school authorities and the University Police Department. 
In State vs. Larocco, supra the Utah Supreme Court holds on 
page 469 as follows: 
Specifically, this court will continue to 
use the concept of expectation of privacy as 
a suitable threshold criterion for 
determining whether Article I, Section 14 
(Utah Constitution) is applicable. Then if 
Article I, Section 14 applies, warrantless 
searches will be permitted only where they 
satisfy their traditional justification, 
namely, to protect the safety of police or 
the public or to prevent the destruction of 
evidence. 
As Justice Durham cites with the approval of Justice 
Zimmerman on the case of State vs Hugh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 
1985) and quotes on page 70 the following: 
Once the threat that the suspect will injure 
the officers with concealed weapons or will 
destroy evidence is gone, there is no 
persuasive reason why the officers cannot 
take the time to secure a warrant. Such a 
requirement would present little impediment 
to police investigations, especially in 
light of the ease with which warrants can be 
obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant 
statute. 
The Court finds that Defendant in this case certainly had 
an expectation of privacy to his dormitory room. Rule 15 of 
the residents hall contract allows university officials to 
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enter and inspect the room at any time, violates the students 
right of expectation of privacy and therefore State vs. Larocco 
applies. 
The Court finds the search made in this case violated the 
Defendant's state constitutional rights as announced in State 
vs. Larocco. 
Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and 
Confession is hereby granted. The Defendant's confession is 
suppressed as part of the illegal search, and would not have 
occurred but for the illegal search. 
Dated this 21st day of May, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
-/w-
Burton H. Harris 
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